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Issues in the Third Circuit
BANKING LAW-HuDsoN UNITED BANK V CHASE MANHA 7TAN BANK,
NA.: THE THIRD CIRCUIT DECIDES THAT FIRREA's VENUE PROVISION
APPLIES TO CLAIMS AGAINST THE RECEIVER
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1989, and in the face of a growing savings and loans
crisis, President Bush signed into law the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).1 Considered by many
to be a bailout statute for failed depository institutions, Congress enacted
FIRREA to rectify existing problems in the thrift industry and establish "a
new era for insured institutions and their regulators." 2 FIRREA granted
power to certain regulatory agencies, under the auspices of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), to assume control of a large
number of failing savings and loans.3 FIRREA has given rise to a number
of legal issues, including whether FIRREA preempts the FDIC's federal
common law claim against bank officers for simple negligence; whether
FIRREA requires a plaintiff suing a failed institution to exhaust the FDIC's
administrative remedies before commencing litigation; and whether fed-
eral courts possess exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims against a failed
institution.
4
1. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at various sections of titles 12 and 15
U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.CA.N. 86, 87 [hereinafter House Report] (abolishing Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation and transferring duties of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of Thrift
Supervision, Federal Housing Finance Board or Resolution Trust Corporation).
3. See Anthony C. Providenti, Jr., Note, Playing With FIRREA, Not Getting
Burned: Statutory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989, 59 FoRDHAM L. REv. S323, S324-35 (1991) (noting FIRREA's mul-
tifaceted goals: establish control and oversight of each institution, promote confi-
dence in the industry, maintain customer services, evaluate each institution's
condition through identifying and accounting for all losses, ensure that each insti-
tution is operated in safe, sound manner, and recommend most viable alternatives
for cost effective resolution in each thrift case).
4. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 370 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding FIRREA's gross negligence standard abrogates federal common law ac-
tion of simple negligence against bank officers); Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v.
Southeast Bank, NA., 39 F.3d 292, 296 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that FIRREA's
administrative procedures must be exhausted before commencing litigation
against failed institution); Carney v. Resolution Trust Corp., 19 F.3d 950, 955 (5th
Cir. 1994) (same); Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp., 991 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.
1993) (same); Marquis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir.
1992) (same); Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 395 (3d Cir.), cert.
(761)
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In Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank,5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed FIRREA's venue provi-
sion, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) (6) (A). This provision allows anyone
raising a claim against a failed depository institution (for which the FDIC
is receiver) to file suit in the district where the depository institution is
located or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 6
In Hudson United Bank, the Hudson United Bank (Hudson) contended
that the venue provision applied only to claims against the depository insti-
tution, rather than to those claims against the receiver itself.7 However,
the Third Circuit concluded that the venue provision applied to claims
against both the receiver and against the failed depository institution. 8
This Casebrief will analyze the issues surrounding FIRREA and its im-
pact on litigants with claims against failed depository institutions. Part II
of this Casebrief offers a concise background of the savings and loan crisis
and the subsequent enactment of FIRREA. 9 Part III presents the facts and
procedural history of Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank.'0 Part
IV of this Casebrief analyzes the Third Circuit's decision to apply the
venue provision of FIRREA to claims against the receiver.11 Finally, Part V
denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991) (same); see also Holmes Financial Associates, Inc. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that state courts
retain jurisdiction over pre-receivership claim). But cf. Lloyd v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 22 F.3d 335, 337 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that federal courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over post-receivership claims); Mansolillo v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 804 F. Supp. 426, 428 (D.R.I. 1992) (same).
5. 43 F.3d 843 (3d Cir. 1994).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (6) (A) (Supp. V 1993). Section 1821(d) (6) (A) reads:
Before the end of the 60-day period beginning on the earlier of -
(i) the end of the period described in paragraph (5) (A) (i) with re-
spect to any claim against a depository institution for which the [FDIC] is
receiver; or
(ii) the date of any notice of disallowance of such claim pursuant to
paragraph (5) (A) (i), the claimant may request administrative review of
the claim . . . or file suit on such claim (or continue an action com-
menced before the appointment of the receiver) in the district or territo-
rial court of the United States for the district within which the depository
institution's principal place of business is located or the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia (and such court shall have
jurisdiction to hear such claim).
Id.
7. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 845. For a discussion of Hudson's argu-
ments on appeal and how the court addressed them, see infra notes 61-95 and
accompanying text.
8. Id. at 849-50. For a discussion of how the court arrived at its holding, see
infra notes 61-95 and accompanying text.
9. For a brief overview of the savings and loan crisis and the enactment of
FIRREA, see infra notes 13-40 and accompanying text.
10. For the facts and procedural history of Hudson United Bank, see infra notes
41-60 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in Hudson United Bank, see
infra notes 61-95 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40: p. 761
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concludes with a discussion of Hudson United Bank's practical ramifications
and legal consequences.
12
II. BACKGROUND
A. Crisis of the 1980s
The collapse of the thrift industry in the United States during the
1980s has been described as an "awful story"' 3 and "disaster." 4 Estimates
of the collapse's total cost to taxpayers exceed $1 trillion. 15 The savings
and loan collapse remains subject to debate because its cause is an enigma
that does not lead to simple answers. Nevertheless, certain important fac-
tors concerning the collapse highlight the debate and help define its
parameters.
Traditionally, savings and loans associations generated income from
the spread between the revenues they gained from fixed, long term mort-
gages and the interest paid on deposits. 16 In 1966, Congress enacted legis-
12. For a discussion of the practical ramifications and legal consequences of
the Hudson United Bank decision, see infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
13. Lawrence J. White, The S & L Debacle, 59 FoRDH" L. Rv. S57, S57
(1991). From 1980 to 1988, over 500 savings and loans failed, a total that repre-
sents more than three-and-a-half as many in the previous 45 years combined. S.
REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
14. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FoRmDHA L. REv. S7, S8
(1991).
15. Id. at S29. The actual expense has been calculated at $130 billion to $170
billion, but because the financing is with 30 to 40-year bonds, interest payments
will continue until the year 2030, making the total cost $1 trillion. Id. at S29 n.144;
see House Report, supra note 2, at 502, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 297 (com-
menting that official calculations are understated). Congressman John LaFalce
expressed his concern about the cost prior to FIRREA's enactment:
The Administration cites the overall cost of the plan at approxi-
mately $90 billion. But, the cost estimates are understated and the eco-
nomic assumptions that underlie them [are] overly optimistic.
An analysis provided by the House Banking Committee staff suggests
that the total cost of the Administration plan, before subtracting esti-
mated revenues, will be approximately $335 billion ....
There are several reasons that the Administration's estimate is so
low. First of all, the Administration's plan calls for the issuance of 30-year
REFCO bonds. However, the Administration has largely focused on pres-
ent value costs and paid too little regard to the interest over time on the
additional debt we are incurring. This understates the real cost.
In contrast, Committee staff projections are based on the assumption
that the new REFCO bonds, like the earlier FICO bonds, will be based on
a 30-year schedule. Under the plan, the interest costs over time fall pri-
marily on the taxpayer. It is this cost that will be a continuing drain on
the average citizen and our economy, and that will necessitate additional
constraints on spending for other important government programs.
Id.
16. Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013, 1019
(1990); see Felsenfeld, supra note 14, at S13. Felsenfeld notes that deposits still
remain the major source of funds for savings and loans. Id. However, where S&L
19951
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lation subjecting savings associations to interest rate ceilings on deposits. 17
As a result, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, many depositors moved
their funds from savings associations when the prevailing interest rates
rose above what the savings and loans could pay.18 To enable the savings
and loan institutions to compete, Congress enacted the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which removed the
artificial constraints upon what savings associations could pay on depos-
its.1 9 However, savings associations began paying more for deposits than
what they were earning on their mortgage portfolios.
20
In response to this dilemma, Congress and many states began loosen-
ing the investing and lending restraints on savings and loans.2 1 Conse-
quently, the management of many savings and loan institutions began to
pursue aggressive lending and investing strategies, many of which
backfired. 22 At the same time, regulatory oversight of savings associations
lessened, allowing for fraud and abuse to occur at savings and loan institu-
tions lacking strong management controls. 23 While the exact cause of the
savings and loan collapse remains largely unclear, it may be partly attrib-
uted to a combination of factors, including: rising interest rates, thrift
industry deregulation, depression of the real estate market, and internal
fraud and mismanagement at many savings and loan institutions.
24
deposits were once considered long term in nature, they are now considered short
term, subjecting the savings accounts to a "high degree of interest rate risk." Id.
17. The Federal Reserve System's Regulation Q codified the ceilings. See 12
C.F.R. § 217.7 '(1977).
18. Clark et al., supra note 16, at 1019; see Felsenfeld, supra note 14, at S16
(noting that "S&L's could not hope to retain their deposits if their regulator-estab-
lished ceilings became misaligned with market rates").
19. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 132, 142 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3501(a)
(1988)).
20. See Clark et al., supra note 16, at 1019-20. The only way for savings and
loans to compete for funds was to offer higher rates than their competitors, among
whom were banks and money market mutual funds. Id. at 1020. As a result, the
S&Ls began paying more for deposits than what they were earning on their long
term mortgages. Id.
21. See Gain-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). The Act allowed savings and loans greater discretion in
their investing and lending practices. Id.
22. Felsenfeld, supra note 14, at S33-34. Professor Felsenfeld noted:[uit is generally agreed that the S&Ls were mismanaged. Simple incom-
petence by inexperienced operators mixed with fraud resulted in badly
conceived loans and investments, loans to officers and directors, sweet-
heart loans to affiliated businesses, cooking the books, bribery and out-
right embezzlement. These occurred in varying measures. The size of
the various peccadillos is difficult to determine .... On the accumulated
evidence, it is undeniable that internal fraud and mismanagement con-
tributed substantially to the S&L failures.
Id. at S34.
23. Clark et al., supra note 16, at 1022.
24. See Felsenfeld, supra note 14, at S41-S49. Professor Felsenfeld argues that
the collapse was due to a combination of the following factors: the disparity be-
[Vol. 40: p. 761
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B. Congress Enacts FIRREA
In 1989, Congress enacted FIRREA with the hope that it would repre-
sent a "new era for insured institutions and their regulators. '25 Among
the purposes of FIRREA was the goal of providing affordable housing fi-
nance and opportunities to low and moderate-income individuals. Con-
gress hoped to accomplish this goal by improving the management of
federal housing credit programs and resources and "establish [ing] organi-
zations and procedures to obtain and administer the necessary funding to
resolve the failed thrift cases and to dispose of the assets of these institu-
tions."26 Congress' evident desire to restructure the responsibility for reg-
ulating savings associations was a central feature of FIRREA. 27
tween the cost of deposits and the rate of return of mortgage portfolios beginning
in the 1970s when interest rates soared, the low premium the federal deposit insur-
ance system set which did not reflect the riskiness of the investments of institu-
tions, the accounting gimmicks used by institutions which concealed their low net
worth, the depression in the real estate market, decreasing the percentage of thrift
portfolios in mortgages, the unwise use of the expanded powers Congress and the
states gave to savings associations in the early 1980s, mismanagement and internal
fraud, an uncontrolled state system, which granted even greater powers to the
S&Ls, and inadequate regulation. Id.; cf. Clark et al., supra note 16, at 1022. Clark
notes:
The precise causes of the thrift industry crisis will undoubtedly be the
subject of much debate in the coming years. The factors most commonly
cited by members of Congress during the deliberations leading to the
passage of [FIRREA] include the rising interest rate environment of the
1970s and early 1980s, the extensive deregulation of the thrift industry at
both the federal and state levels during the"1980s, the failure of the Bank
Board and state regulators to properly supervise savings associations, the
economic downturn in the Southwest, and managerial incompetence and
outright fraud by the operators of many thrift institutions.
Id.
25. House Report, supra note 2, at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 87.
Congress sought to "restore public confidence in the savings and loans industry in
order to ensure a safe, stable, and viable system of affordable housing finance." Id.
at 307, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 103.
26. Id. at 307, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 103. Congress also sought to:
establish a distinction between the regulatory and insurance functions of
the thrift industry by (1) ensuring a well capitalized and independent
thrift insurance fund, (2) enhancing thrift industry regulation by provid-
ing for stronger supervisory oversight of the industry under the Depart-
ment of the Treasury; establish stronger capital standards for thrifts; and,
enhance the regulatory enforcement powers of the depository institution
regulatory agencies to protect against fraud, waste and insider abuse.
Id. at 307-08, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 103-04.
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. V 1993). Congress spelled out the purposes
of FIRREA:
(1) To promote, through regulatory reform, a safe and stable system of
affordable housing finance.
(2) To improve the supervision of savings associations by strengthening
capital, accounting, and other supervisory standards.
(3) To curtail investments and other activities of savings associations that
pose unacceptable risks to Federal deposit insurance funds.
1995]
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One major change in this effort involved the enhancement of the
FDIC's powers.2 8 The FDIC is responsible for insuring deposits of savings
associations. 29 Although the FDIC is not the primary regulator of savings
associations, FIRREA enhanced its regulatory powers, including its power
to act as a conservator or receiver. 30 Specifically, § 1821(d) of 12 U.S.C.
grants the FDIC its powers as conservator or receiver of failed institu-
tions.3 1 Moreover, § 1821 (d) gives the FDIC a broad range of authority in
its activities as receiver and conservator.3 2 For example, FIRREA granted
(4) To promote the independence of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration from the institutions the deposits of which it insures, by provid-
ing an independent board of directors, adequate funding, and
appropriate powers.
(5) To put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound financial
footing.
(6) To establish an Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department of the
Treasury, under the general oversight of the Secretary of Treasury.
(7) To establish a new corporation, to be known as the Resolution Trust
Corporation, to contain, manage, and resolve failed savings associations.
(8) To provide funds from public and private sources to deal expedi-
tiously with failed depository institutions.
(9) To strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of de-
pository institutions.
(10) To strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for de-
frauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their
depositors.
Id.
28. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834 (Supp. V 1993). Section 1811 reads: "[t] here is
created a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ... which shall insure, as herein-
after provided, the deposits of all banks and savings associations which are entitled
to the benefits of insurance under this chapter, and which shall have the powers
hereinafter granted." Id.
29. Clark et al., supra note 16, at 1026. FIRREA created a new fund, the Sav-
ings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), from which the FDIC obtains funding for
savings associations that were not insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC). Id. The FSLIC became insolvent in meeting its obliga-
tions to depositors of failed thrifts. Id. at 1013-14.
30. Id. at 1026.
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (Supp. V 1993).
32. See House Report, supra note 2, at 330-31, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 126-
27. Congress stated:
the authority includes the power as conservator to conduct business, in-
cluding taking deposits, and performing all functions of the financial in-
stitution in its own name; to take necessary action to put the institution in
sound and solvent condition; as receiver to merge the institution with
another insured financial institution; to organize a Federal savings associ-
ation to take over assets and liabilities from a failed thrift, or to organize a
bridge bank or a new national bank to take over assets and liabilities of
any insured financial institution; to transfer assets or liabilities of the fi-
nancial institution, including those associated with any trust business car-
ried on by the institution, without any further approvals; and to
determine claims; and to exercise all powers and authorities granted by
the Act or incidental thereto.
[Vol. 40: p. 761
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the FDIC the ability to determine claims3 3 and also established claims pro-
cedures in cases where the FDIC is appointed receiver.3 4
Since Congress enacted FIRREA in 1989, the Third Circuit has ad-
dressed the topic of § 1821 (d) and its claims procedures several times.
First, in Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp.,35 the Third Circuit held that the
jurisdictional bar of § 1821(d)(13)(D) applied to claims against the re-
ceiver as well as the failed depository institution, and that the jurisdictional
bar applied to claims against the institution after the institution had en-
tered receivership.3 6 In addition to the Third Circuit's holding in Rosa,
the court also held in both Praxis Properties v. Colonial Savings Bank 7 and
Althouse v. Resolution Trust Corp.3 8 that FIRREA mandates that administra-
tive claims procedures must be exhausted before the judiciary takes any
action.3 9 However, the Third Circuit, before its holding in Hudson United
Bank, never directly addressed whether the venue provision of
§ 1821(d) (6) (A) applies in cases against the receiver.4°
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1987, Citytrust, a state bank licensed in Connecticut, extended a
$1.25 million line of credit and a $1 million term loan to Kleinberg Elec-
tric, a New York corporation. 41 Hudson, a New Jersey corporation, then
purchased a sixty-three percent participation in the term loan from City-
trust pursuant to their Loan Participation Agreement. 42 Citytrust eventu-
ally went bankrupt, and was placed under the FDIC's control as Receiver
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (3) (Supp. V 1993).
34. Id. § 1821(d) (5). For a general discussion of the powers and duties of the
FDIC, see House Report, supra note 2, at 331, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 127.
35. 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991).
36. Id. at 392-94. In Rosa, the plaintiff argued that the jurisdictional bar of§ 1821(d) (13) (D) did not apply to claims against an institution that arise once a
conservator or receiver is appointed for that institution. Id. at 392. The court
rejected this claim, holding that the language of § 1821(d)(13) did not apply
solely to "pre-takeover" institutions. Id. at 392-93.
37. 947 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1991).
38. 969 F.2d 1544 (3d Cir. 1992).
39. Althouse, 969 F.2d at 1545-46; Praxis, 947 F.2d at 63-64. Althouse also held
that if a claimant fails to file a timely claim, then the claimant is barred from seek-
ing any judicial action. Althouse, 969 F.2d at 1545-46. Under § 1821(d), judicial
action includes declaratory judgments. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Say.,
FSB, 28 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1994).
40. For a further discussion of Hudson United Bank, see infra notes 41-95 and
accompanying text.
41. Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 832 F. Supp. 881,
882-83 (D.N.J. 1993).
42. Id. at 883. Plaintiff Hudson United Bank is the successor in interest to
HUB National Bank, formerly known as Meadowlands National Bank. Id. at 882.
The Loan Participation Agreement is an asset that at the time of the district court's
opinion amounted to 10% of Hudson's capital. Id. at 883.
1995]
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in August of 1991. 43 The FDIC sought a buyer for Citytrust and subse-
quently entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement with Chase
Manhattan Bank (Chase), which allowed Chase to "put" any unwanted as-
sets back into the Receiver." Thereafter, the FDIC appointed Consoli-
dated Asset Recovery Corporation (CARC), a Chase subsidiary, to manage
(with FDIC supervision) the pool of Citytrust assets the FDIC retained or
reacquired pursuant to the "put" provisions of the Purchase and Assump-
tion Agreement.45
Shortly after Citytrust's bankruptcy declaration in August of 1991 and
the beginning of its new arrangement with CARC, Hudson stopped receiv-
ing payments from the Kleinberg loan. 46 Furthermore, Chase terminated
the Kleinberg line of credit, apparently upon the closing of the FDIC's
Purchase and Assumption Agreement.47 Two months later, Chase "put"
the Kleinberg loans back to the FDIC so that CARC could manage them. 48
43. Id. at 883. The FDIC was appointed receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(c)(2)(ii), which reads, in relevant part: "[t]he [FDIC] shall be appointed
receiver, and shall accept such appointment, whenever a receiver is appointed for
the purpose of liquidation or winding up the affairs of an insured Federal deposi-
tory institution or District bank .... " 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(ii) (Supp. V 1993).
44. Hudson United Bank, 832 F. Supp. at 883. Section 1821(d) lists the powers
of the FDIC as receiver. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(E). In particular,
§ 1821(d) (2) (E) states that "the [FDIC] may .... , as receiver, place the insured
depository institution in liquidation and proceed to realize on the assets of the
institution .... Id. § 1821(d)(2)(E).
Another option, which the FDIC chose here, is to enter into a "Purchase and
Assumption" agreement with a healthy bank. Id. § 1823(c) (2). Under a "Purchase
and Assumption Agreement," the FDIC as receiver of the failed bank sells the
failed bank's "good assets" to a sound, insured bank, in exchange for that bank's
promise to pay the failed bank's depositors. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. La Ram-
bla Shopping Center, Inc., 791 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 1986). The FDIC sells its
remaining "bad assets" to the FDIC itself, in its corporate capacity. Id. The FDIC
in its corporate capacity pays the FDIC as receiver for the "bad assets," and the
receiver in turn pays the healthy bank enough money to make up the difference
between what the healthy bank must pay the depositors and what the healthy bank
paid for the failed bank's "good assets" and "good will." Id. The FDIC in its corpo-
rate capacity then does its best to sell the "bad assets," turning over any money
realized to the FDIC as receiver for payment to the failed bank's creditors. Id.
Note that the FDIC assumes two distinct legal identities: (1) as receiver, and (2) as
purchaser in its corporate capacity. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 725 F.2d 634, 638 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829
(1984) (noting two distinct legal identities of FDIC); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Citizens Bank & Trust, 592 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829
(1979) (same). See generally, Marie T. Reilly, The FDIC as Holder in Due Course, 1992
COLUM. Bus. L. Rtv. 165, 171 (describing two capacities of FDIC).
45. Hudson United Bank, 832 F. Supp. at 883. For a brief explanation of a
"Purchase and Assumption" agreement, see supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. Id. For a brief explanation of a "Purchase and Assumption" agreement,
see supra note 44.
48. Id. Chase determined that the Kleinberg loans were poor credit risks. Id.
768 [Vol. 40: p. 761
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By November of 1991, Hudson inquired about the status of the Klein-
berg term loan and was informed of Citytrust's failure for the first time. 49
During the same period, CARC accelerated the Kleinberg loans, forcing
Kleinberg to file for bankruptcy protection under chapter eleven of the
Bankruptcy Code.50 Although Kleinberg continued to make payments to
CARC on its debts for the Citytrust loans, CARC allegedly failed to pay
Hudson its fair share of these payments.5 1 By November of 1991, Hudson
appeared to be losing money on the Kleinberg loan participation. 52 In
March of 1992, Chase deposited $476,176.80 into an account Hudson
maintained at Chase, and Hudson withdrew the money as payment in full
of the loan participation.53 Chase then decided that it had mistakenly
deposited the money, and asked the bank to return the deposited funds. 54
Hudson subsequently filed a claim in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, seeking a declaratory judgment concerning its
rights to the deposited funds.55 Chase filed a counterclaim requesting the
return of the funds.56
After filing its complaint, Hudson asked the FDIC receiver whether
administrative review was a prerequisite to bringing suit.57 In its response,
the FDIC forwarded a claim notice to Hudson, and Hudson filed its claim
on April 15, 1993.58 The FDIC denied the claim and moved to transfer
the claim to the District of Connecticut.59 The district court granted the
FDIC's motion to transfer, and certified for interlocutory appeal the issue
of whether the District Court of New Jersey was the proper venue for the
action. 60
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Hudson filed the claim on August 19, 1992, alleging the following:
breach of the Loan Participation Agreement, breach of the duty of good faith,
breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment. Id. at 883-84. Hudson
charged that the FDIC breached its duty of good faith because it failed to advise
Hudson of Citytrust's failure and the termination of the Kleinberg's line of credit,
and by acting in its own self interest "to the detriment of" Hudson. Id. at 883.
56. Id. at 884.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The FDIC moved to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which
reads: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988).
60. Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 43 F.3d 843, 845-46 (3d
Cir. 1994).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Interpreting FIRREA 's "Impenetrable Thicket"6 1
The Third Circuit attempted to settle two interrelated issues in Hud-
son United Bank (1) whether FIRREA's venue provision governs only ac-
dons against the depository institution and not the receiver; and (2)
whether the claims procedures established in FIRREA cover actions
against the receiver and actions against the failed depository institution.6 2
The resolution of both issues depends largely on statutory
interpretation. 6 3
Hudson argued on appeal that § 1821 (d) (6) (A) and its venue provi-
sion should be read literally, and because § 1821(d) (13) (D) provides spe-
cifically for claims against the receiver, and § 1821 (d) (6) (A) does not, the
venue provision of § 1821(d) (6) (A) does not apply to actions against the
receiver.64 The Third Circuit, however, agreed with the district court's
61. Marquis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992).
62. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 844; see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (6) (A) (Supp.
1993) (venue provision); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (claims procedures).
Because the plaintiff filed in federal court, the issue of whether FIRREA grants
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction did not arise in Hudson United Bank. Section
1821(d) (6) (A) states, in relevant part:
[T] he claimant may request administrative review of the claim ... or file
suit on such claim (or continue an action commenced before the appointment of
the receiver) in the district or territorial court of the United States for the
district within which the depository institution's principal place of busi-
ness is located or the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia (and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (6) (A) (emphasis added). Most courts hold that an action
commenced in state court before the receiver takes over the failed institution can
continue in state court. See, e.g., Guidry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 790 F. Supp.
651 (E.D. La. 1992) (holding that parties can maintain claims in state courts);
Coston v. Gold Coast Graphics, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1532, 1534-35 (S.D. Fla. 1992)(same); Robbins v. Foothill Nissan, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 197 (Ct. App. 1994)(same); Armstrong v. Resolution Trust Corp., 623 N.E.2d 291, 295-96 (Ill. 1993)(same); Berke v. Resolution Trust Corp., 483 N.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (same); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Binford, 844 P.2d 810, 816 (N.M. 1992)
(same); Herbst v. Resolution Trust Corp., 607 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Ohio 1993)(same). However, if a claim arises after the receiver takes over, courts hold that
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See Lloyd v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
22 F.3d 335, 336 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over post-receivership claims); Mansolillo v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 426, 428 (D.R.I. 1992) (same).
63. See Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 706 (1st
Cir. 1992) ("[TIhe task of interpretation begins with the text of the statute itself,
and statutory language must be accorded its ordinary meaning."); Hellon & Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[1]f statutory
language is clear, we need look no further than that language itself in determining
the meaning of the statute."). Determining FIRREA's ordinary meaning, however,
has proven to be no easy task. See Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849 ("FIRREA is
awkwardly written and difficult to interpret."); Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
991 F.2d 481, 486 (8th Cir. 1993) ("FIRREA is not a model of statutory clarity.").
64. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 847; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(6) (A),
1821(d) (13)(D) (Supp. V 1993).
10
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reasoning, looking to the other sections of FIRREA detailing the claims
procedures that help interpret the venue provision of § 1821 (d) (6) (A). 6 5
The Third Circuit, further accepting the district court's reasoning,
noted that § 1821(d) (6) (A) must be linked to § 1821(d) (5) (A) because
§ 1821(d) (6) (A) expressly refers to § 1821(d) (5) (A).6 6 If one concludes
that § 1821 (d) (5) (A) did not apply to receivers, then one must also con-
clude that § 1821(d) (6) (A) did not apply to receivers. 67 However, both
the district court and the Third Circuit observed that courts "routinely
treat claims against the Receiver ... as claims within the scope of para-
graph (5). ,68
The Third Circuit, continuing to follow the district court's reasoning,
then explained why § 1821 (d) (5) must apply to receivers as well as failed
depository institutions. 69 Section 1821(d) (13) (D) bars jurisdiction in a
court unless the claims procedures set forth in FIRREA are exhausted, and
this bar applies to both depository institutions and receivers. 70 Thus, un-
less § 1821 (d) (5) also applied to receivers, there would be no mechanism
to review claims against the receiver.7 1 Moreover, if § 1821 (d) (5) (A) did
65. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 847. The court noted with approval that
the district court followed the approach of Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938
F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991). The court in Rosa faced the
task of interpreting § 1821(d) (13) (D), which prevents a court from asserting juris-
diction over § 1821 claims until a party exhausts FIRREA's claims procedures.
Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 847. The court in Rosa looked to
§ 1821 (d) (13) (D) (i) to guide them in interpreting § 1821(d) (13) (D) (ii). See id. at
391-92 (reading two sections together and holding that § 1821(d)(13)(D) does
not apply to "pre-takeover" institutions).
66. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 848-49.
67. See Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 832 F. Supp. 881, 886
(D.N.J. 1993) ("If [a court] were to read these paragraphs literally ... [a court]
would have to exempt claims against the Receiver not only from paragraph (6) (A),
but also from administrative review under paragraph (5).").
68. Id.; Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 848. Both the district court and the
Third Circuit cited the following as standing for the proposition that claims against
the receiver are within the scope of FIRREA's claims procedures: Althouse v. Reso-
lution Trust Corp., 969 F.2d 1544, 1545-46 (3d Cir. 1992); Praxis Properties, Inc. v.
Colonial Sav. Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 62-64 (3d Cir. 1991); Rosa, 938 F.2d at 395-96.
69. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 848-49.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (Supp. V 1993); see Bueford v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 991 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that language indicates
court shall not have jurisdiction until claims procedures are exhausted); Hender-
son v. Bank of New England, 986 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 559 (1993); Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union Local 2 v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 962 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same); Meliezer v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 952 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); Abbott Bldg.
Corp. v. United States, 951 F.2d 191, 194 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).
The statute clearly reads that a claimant is entitled to file a claim in federal
court once the claimant has complied with the claims procedures, and that the
federal court shall have de novojurisdiction. See Rosa, 938 F.2d at 391 (holding that
once claims procedures are exhausted, court has de novojurisdiction); Bueford, 991
F.2d at 486 (same); Office and Professional Employees, 962 F.2d at 65 (same).
71. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849.
1995]
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not apply to receivers, "then 1821(d) (13) (D) would compel a complete
bar of review of claims against the receiver because no grant ofjurisdiction
exists elsewhere in 1821 (d)." 72 Consequently, an interpretation that does
not apply § 1821(d) (5) (A) to receivers renders receivers immune from
suit - a result Congress could not have intended.7 3 The Third Circuit
rejected Hudson's claim that there is an implicit grant of jurisdiction
against the receiver in § 1821 (d) (5) (C) and § 1821 (d) (6) (B), which refer
to "any claims," characterizing this contention as a "strained" argument. 74
Ultimately, the Third Circuit found that a correct reading of
§ 1821(d)(6)(A) requires application of the venue provision to claims
against both the depository institution and the receiver.75 In reaching this
holding, the court asserted that this conclusion avoids the possibility that
§ 1821 (d) (13) (A) can "operate as an independent and outright bar of ju-
risdiction," and would operate as a statutory exhaustion requirement.76
B. Should § 1821(e) Control?
Hudson, relying on Heno v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (Heno 1),77
next argued that § 1821 (d) is inappropriate for breach of contract actions
72. Id. at 848.
73. Id. at 848-49. The district court observed:
Logic dictates that the claims barred by paragraph (13) (D) must coincide
with those that may be filed under the administrative procedures of para-
graph (5). Otherwise, paragraphs (5) and 13(D) would bar relief in the
district court without providing relief elsewhere, and FIRREA would be-
come a source of immunity for the Receiver .... Congress intended for
FIRREA to channel claims through the administrative process ... not to
immunize the Receiver.
Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 832 F. Supp. 881, 886 (D.N.J.
1993) (citations omitted); see Rosa, 938 F.2d at 396 ("The primary purpose underly-
ing FIRREA's exhaustion scheme is to allow [the receiver] to perform its statutory
function of promptly determining claims so as to quickly and efficiently resolve
claims against a failed institution without resorting to litigation.").
74. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 850. In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. City
Savings F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit noted that
§ 1821(d) (13) (D) refers to "any actions," whereas § 1821(d) (5) (A) refers to
"claims". Id. The question raised and left unresolved in National Union was
whether "claims" referred only to a subset of possible actions. Id. at 385. If this
limitation existed, then all actions not characterized as claims would consequently
face a jurisdictional bar according to the language of § 1821(d) (13) (D). Id. The
Hudson United Bank court decided that § 1821(d) (13) (D) and § 1821(d) (5) have
concurrent scope. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849-50.
77. Heno v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 996 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1993) [herein-
after Heno 1], rev'd, 20 F.3d 1204 (1st Cir. 1994). In Heno I, the FDIC repudiated
the plaintiff's contract after the claims filing period of § 1821(d) elapsed. Id. at
431. Under § 1821 (d) (13) (D), no court could assert jurisdiction until administra-
tive review occurred and in this case the injured party could no longer file a claim
to obtain administrative review. Id. The court held that because Congress did not
intend to apply the administrative review procedures under § 1821 (d) to preclude
review of post-receivership claims arising after the 90-day period, the "reasonable
12
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and that § 1821 (e) properly controls.78 In Heno I, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit applied the § 1821(e) time bar in deter-
mining that the § 1821 (d) time bar would be unfair. 79 However, the court
withdrew Heno I when the FDIC persuaded the court that its internal
agency manual procedures would allow it to review Heno's claims even
though Heno missed the niney-day time limit.80 In Heno II, the court
found that resorting to § 1821 (e) in post-receivership claims against the
receiver is unnecessary. 81
Hudson, nevertheless, still wished to rely on Heno L82 However, the
Third Circuit observed that if the holding of Heno I rested on the agency's
refusal to review Heno's claims, then the holding is inapposite here be-
cause the FDIC heard and rejected Hudson's claim.83 Moreover, if the
holding in Heno I rested on the notion that contract claims against the
receiver are not subject to administrative review, then the holding is incon-
sistent with both Heno II and Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp.
8 4
period" deadline of § 1821(e) would apply. Id. at 432-34. "Congress decided not
to superimpose on the subsection 1821(e) contract repudiation process the fixed
deadlines made applicable under subsection 1821(d)." Id. at 434.
78. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 850.
79. Id. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (3) (B) reads, in relevant part:
The receiver, in any case involving the liquidation or winding up of the
affairs of a closed depository institution, shall-
(i) promptly publish a notice to the depository institution's creditors to
present their claims, together with proof, to the receiver by a date speci-
fied in the notice which shall be not less than 90 days after the publication of
such notice ....
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (3) (B) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
80. Heno v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 20 F.3d 1204 (1st Cir. 1994) [herein-
after Heno II]. The court in Heno II deferred to the FDIC's interpretation that the
FDIC's treatment of Heno's administrative review requests (which occurred after
the 90-day time bar of § 1821 (d) (3) (B)) was "tantamount to administrative review"
according to its internal agency manual procedures. Id. at 1209-10. Thus, because
Heno then technically met the statutory exhaustion requirement of
§ 1821 (d) (13) (A), the statute did not bar Heno from filing suit in court. Id.
81. Id. at 1209-10.
82. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 850. Hudson's counsel relied on Heno Iin
its brief, but by the time oral arguments began, the First Circuit had decided Heno
II. Id. at 850-51.
83. Id. at 850-51.
84. See Heno II, 20 F.3d at 1204 (holding that contract claims against receivers
are subject to administrative review); Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383,
392-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991). In Rosa, the Third Circuit held
that "post-takeover" claims against the receiver were included within the scope of
§ 1821(d) (13) (A), which contains a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 392-93. The court
declined to hold that § 1821(d) applied only to "pre-takeover" depository institu-
tions. Id. Thus, this holding is consistent with the Third Circuit's rejection of the
Hudson argument that breach of contract claims must be considered under
§ 1821(e). Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 850-51; cf. Homeland Stores, Inc. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 317 (1994).
Homeland Stores involved a case where the receiver, after taking control of a failed
S&L, breached a lease contract. Id. at 1270-71. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit held that the term "claim," as used in § 1821 (d), could
13
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C. Are FIRREA's Claims Procedures Unconstitutional?
Hudson also contended that the time constraints imposed by 12
U.S.C. § 1821 (d) (6) (A), in combination with the cut-off date provision for
the claim submission provisions of § 1821 (d) (3) (B), could raise constitu-
tional problems in certain cases.8 5 The argument states: the plaintiff has
a claim against a receiver due to an injury occurring after the
§ 1821(d) (3) (B) deadline.86 The receiver, who under § 1821 (d) (5) (C)
has discretion to hear late claims, decides not to hear the claim.8 7 Section
1821 (d) (13) (D) would then act as a bar to judicial review because admin-
istrative review was not undertaken.8 8 Thus, the injured party is left with
no remedy for the alleged injury, a violation of due process.8 9
not apply to a claim such as this. Id. at 1274. The Tenth Circuit, faced with the
same dilemma as the Heno I court (a post-receivership claim arising after the 90-
day time bar) concluded that § 1821(d) could not be read to include claims
against the receiver after the receiver takes over an institution. Id. The Third Cir-
cuit in Hudson United Bank rejected the Homeland Stores holding and followed the
reasoning it employed in Rosa, holding that post-receivership claims against the
receiver are within the scope of § 1821(d). Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 850; see
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Say. Bank of Minot, 4 F.3d 1490, 1496-97
(9th Cir. 1993) (advancing position that jurisdictional bar of § 1821(d) (13) (D)
should be limited to those claims actually covered by § 1821(d) (5) and
§ 1821(d) (6)), rev'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 1994); National Trust
for Historic Preservation in United States v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir.),
vacated, 5 F.3d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993), modified, 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 683 (1994) (same); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. DiStefano, 839 F. Supp.
110, 115-16 (D.R.I. 1993) (same); In re Continental Fin. Resources, Inc., 154 B.R.
385, 387-88 (D. Mass. 1993) (same); In re Purcell, 150 B.R. 111, 113-16 (D. Vt.
1993) (same).
85. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 851. For the text of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(3)(B), see supra note 79. For the text of § 1821(d) (6) (A), see supra
note 6.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) (5) (C) (Supp. V 1993).
88. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 851; see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (13) (D).
89. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 851. The Third Circuit, in National Union
Fire Insurance Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1994), recognized
this potential problem. Id. at 389-90. The Third Circuit in National Union held
that, because the plaintiff did not seek administrative review of his claims before
seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court, the statute precluded the federal
court from asserting jurisdiction over the case. Id. The court also contrasted the
language of § 1821(d)(5) and § 1821(d)(6) with the language of
§ 1821(d) (13) (D), and noted that the claims referred to in § 1821(d) (13) (D) may
have a broader reach than those claims referred to in § 1821(d)(6). Id. at 386-88.
The court recognized a problem:
[W]e acknowledge that it is possible that in some factual settings the
broad bar to jurisdiction contained in § 1821 (d) (13) (D) could raise con-
stitutional concerns. Such a situation could arise if the holder of an ac-
tion asserting a right to payment were not provided reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard in the administrative claims procedure.
In such a setting, application of the broad jurisdictional bar, as stated
above, would appear to be unconstitutional.
[Vol. 40: p. 761
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Hudson argued that each claim based on the acts or omissions of a
receiver should proceed under § 1821(d) (5) (C) instead of
§ 1821(d) (6) (A). 90 The time constraints and the venue provision of
§ 1821 (d) (6) (A) would then not apply.9 1 Furthermore, Hudson argued
that § 1821(d) (5) (C) should be read to mandate hearing late claims, thus
relieving the due process concerns raised whenever the FDIC exercises its
discretion not to hear a late claim, and this exercise results in a jurisdic-
tional bar.9 2
The Third Circuit in Hudson United Bank refused to read FIRREA as
suggesting the need for two separate claims procedures. 93 Instead, the
court held that where the jurisdictional bar of § 1821 (d) could not be ap-
plied constitutionally, the court would maintain jurisdiction.94 The court
felt that a single claims procedure was more consistent with their decision
in Rosa, where the court held that "claims against the receiver ... were
subject to the 'statutory exhaustion requirement' of administrative review
before the courts had jurisdiction over them."95
V. CONCLUSION
FIRREA is "awkwardly written," 96 and Congress, perhaps in its haste to
deal with a growing savings and loan crisis and the imminent collapse of
many depository institutions, neglected to state explicitly whether the FIR-
REA's claims procedures apply to claims against the receiver.97 Read liter-
ally, the venue provision applies only to claims against the failed
depository institution.98
Id. at 392. Hudson United Bank eliminated at least one potential problem, holding
that § 1821(d) (13) (D) and §§ 1821(d) (5), (d) (6) have concurrent scope. Hudson
United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849-50.
90. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 851.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 850-52.
93. Id.; cf. Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269
(10th Cir. 1994) (establishing different claims procedure for claims arising after
receiver takes control); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank of Minot,
4 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir.) (holding that claims procedure does not apply, at least
where affirmative defense is presented), vacated, 36 F.3d 1490 (9th Cir. 1993).
94. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 852.
95. Id. (citing Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 392-93 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 981 (1991).
96. Id. at 849.
97. See Marquis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 965 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1992).
The Marquis court found: "FIRREA's text comprises an almost impenetrable
thicket, overgrown with sections, subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, clauses,
and subclauses - a veritable jungle of linguistic fronds and brambles. In light of
its prolixity and lack of coherence, confusion over its proper interpretation is not
only unsurprising - it is inevitable." Id. at 1151.
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (6) (A) (Supp. V 1993). For the text of§ 1821 (d) (6) (A), see supra note 6.
1995]
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Thus, a gap exists in FIRREA. Section 1821 (d) (13) (D) reads that no
court shall have jurisdiction over any claim against a receiver except as
provided for in § 1821(d). 9 9 However, § 1821(d) does not provide, at
least expressly, that the claims procedures apply to claims against the re-
ceiver.' 0 0 Consequently, one must then conclude that either Congress did
not intend to apply the statutory exhaustion requirement of § 1821 (d) to
receivers, or that Congress intended to include the receiver within the lan-
guage of 1821 (d) (6) (A). 10 1
The venue provision of FIRREA, which requires a claimant to file suit
in either the district in which the depository institution was located or the
District of Columbia, is designed to promote efficiency in adjudicating
claims against failed depository institutions. 10 2 Presumably, those same
concerns are present when the claim is against the receiver, so that read-
ing § 1821 (d) (6) (A) to allow its application to receivers also promotes this
goal of efficiency. 10 3
Nonetheless, one caveat remains. By holding that § 1821 (d) (13) (D),
§ 1821 (d) (5) and § 1821 (d) (6) have concurrent scope, the Third Circuit
precluded the possibility that a claim not subject to the claims procedures
might also be barred from being heard in court. 10 4 However, where a
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d) (13) (D).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (6) (A). For the text of § 1821(d)(6)(A) see supra
note 6.
101. See Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 832 F. Supp. 881,
886 (D.NJ. 1993) ("Otherwise paragraphs (5) and (13) (D) would bar relief in the
district court without providing relief elsewhere, and FIRREA would become a
source of immunity for the receiver. This is not a result intended by Congress.").
102. See Marquis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 965 F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir.
1992) ("Faced with a national banking crisis, Congress wanted to facilitate take-
overs of insolvent financial institutions and smooth the modalities by which reha-
bilitation might be accomplished. To this end, FIRREA was designed to create an
efficient administrative protocol for processing claims against failed banks");
House Report, supra note 2, at 419, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 215 ("The
claims determination procedure .. .creates a system [that] enables the FDIC to
dispose of the bulk of their claims against failed financial institutions expeditiously
and fairly.").
103. See Hudson United Bank, 832 F. Supp. at 887 ("Congress ... expedited the
prompt resolution of lawsuits involving failed institutions by directing that the law-
suits be filed in only two locations: the institution's principal place of business or
the District of Columbia .... Without this forum clause, the FDIC would be
'forced to defend actions at various locations throughout the country, with the
attendant disruption of the Bank's records and personnel, [and] the defendant's
task would become further complicated'." (quoting TPO Inc. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 663, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1971))). Because the FDIC is con-
ducting the business of the financial institution, it would be more efficient for the
FDIC to defend claims near that place of business. Hudson United Bank v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 43 F.3d 843, 849 (3d Cir. 1994).
104. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849-50. In National Union Fire Insurance
Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit left this
question open. Id. at 387 n.12. In National Union, the plaintiffs were insurance
companies who instituted a declaratory judgment action, seeking to rescind insur-
ance policies under which the receiver was seeking coverage. Id. at 380-81. Thus,
[Vol. 40: p. 761
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claim arises after the ninety-day time bar and the FDIC refuses to hear the
claim because of a late filing, expect the Third Circuit to rule that the
jurisdictional bar of § 1821 (d)(13) (D) does not apply and a federal court
would have jurisdiction.10 5 Otherwise, all claims, including those arising
after the receiver takes control of the failed institution, are subject to the
claims procedures of § 1821(d) and the venue provision of
§ 1821 (d) (6) (A). 10 6
Robert N. Dengler
the case presented a debtor's claim asserted against the receiver. Id. at 385. The
administrative claims procedures of § 1821(d) apply only to creditor's claims. Id.
If § 1821 (d) (13) (D) covered a class of claims larger than creditor's claims, some in
that class may be denied due process. Id. at 385-89. For example, a debtor with a
claim such as the one in National Union would not have reasonable notice or an
opportunity to be heard in the administrative claims procedure. Id. at 389. Yet,
they could be barred from the courts under the jurisdictional bar of
§ 1821(d) (13) (D). Id. The Third Circuit, although noting this potential constitu-
tional violation, justified barring the declaratory judgment action under
§ 1821(d) (13) (D) on the grounds that it was merely a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. Id. at 388. In-National Union, the plaintiffs sought to determine their rights;
they had not been sued by the RTC. Id. If the RTC decided not to sue, declaratory
judgment relief would be unnecessary. Id. If the RTC decided to sue, then the
plaintiffs could defend themselves at that time. Id. The Third Circuit in Hudson
United Bank answered the open question, holding that the jurisdictional bar in
§ 1821 (d) (13) (D) referred only to those claims that were within the scope of the
claims procedures of § 1821(d). Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 849-50. However,
the Third Circuit's holding in National Union that claimants not within the scope of
the claims procedures but seeking a dedaratoiy judgment action would be subject to
the jurisdictional bar was not addressed in Hudson United Bank, and this holding
presumably still stands.
105. Hudson United Bank, 43 F.3d at 852 (suggesting that where jurisdictional
bar could not be constitutionally applied, court would have jurisdiction to hear
claim); National Union, 28 F.3d at 389-90 n.16, 393 n.22. Although the jurisdic-
tional bar would not apply in such a situation, the venue provision would. There-
fore, there would be no conceivable reason why a court, in disregarding the
jurisdictional bar, would also disregard the venue provision. See id. at 392 n.22
("Courts routinely declare particular applications of a statute unconstitutional,
while leaving the statute intact.").
. 106. Hudson United Bank 43 F.3d at 852 (stating Third Circuit's preference
for single claims procedure).
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